QUOTE (Uncle Leo @ Dec 21 2008, 09:19 PM)

People that have known me long enough, and I've been around here for a few years, know that I am the slippery-slope poster child. I see it all over the place and consider it a part of human nature to a great degree. Having said that, equating unjustified arrests, tortures, and even deaths, as implied by "papers please" and the crystal clear implications that goes along with said phrase, to vague random ID checking for using a credit card ain't it. One can claim the slippery slope if they want, but you'd have to slide down 98% of frickin Mt Everest to get even close.
Please re-read my post. I never equated the two, nor would any reasonable person ever suggest such a parallel.
Yes, there are some who do, but that tone isn't present in this discussion. Those extreme types don't use plastic to begin with, citing privacy concerns at the bank itself.
One of the broader reaching civil liberties components of the ID debate focuses on the habituation of the public to ID checks in daily life. The slippery slope is present and very real, although for the purposes of arguing against ID its presence or lack thereof isn't necessary.
Proof of identity is not inherently necessary to most retail transactions. Unless the customer is purchasing legally controlled products, or entering into a binding contract, all the merchant needs to know is that funds are good. Traditionally, this has been accomplished through paper currency that is difficult to reproduce; in essence, proof of payment was accomplished by examining banknotes for signs of authenticity. A signature-based card transaction can be authorized in real time to know that funds from the account are good. The only concern comes when that authorization is potentially reversed due to fraud. Proper adherence to card acceptance procedure can make card-based fraud losses far less of a concern than shoplifting, employee theft, UPC fraud, or return fraud. If signature transactions are phased out in favor of chip and pin, as they should be, we can add an additional layer of security to a merchant's knowledge that funds are good and will remain after settlement.
The habituation argument isn't exactly watertight, as merchants aren't acting as a central body looking to normalize ID checks for some nefarious reason apart from verifying ownership of a card. Other organizations may very well seek to do that, but that isn't the issue at hand. Apart from habituation, we have another issue with functionality creep that is actively happening with ID, particularly drivers' licenses. DLs were originally issued to drivers who passed basic safety and registration requirements, and were only used to keep the roads orderly and safe. Older licenses were printed on paper, and then laminated paper. They were easy to duplicate, but nobody really did that when they were only used to establish driving privileges. Eventually, DLs became used as the de facto document of American identity (issued much more widely than the passport), and have become used for a wide array of purposes having nothing to do with motor vehicles.
ID as a whole is creeping into places where it is neither necessary or helpful. Have you ever seen a public official glancing at the IDs of citizens using public transportation? To the best of my knowledge, there is no "do not ride" list, and the guilty parties do nothing other than verify that every rider has what appears to be a valid identity document on or about their person. The instances of similar behavior are extensive and could easily fill a book.
If customers choose not to care about privacy or civil liberties, that is certainly their choice. What I find is that most people don't understand the issue at hand until they are educated as to the problem. In the most practical of sense, it can be said that a person can always get a new card number if the old one is misused. A person's name, address, birth date, and ID number cannot be changed when they fall into the wrong hands. Explaining that perspective to someone who could care less about societal implications usually changes their mind on why ID is bad. Most people seem to understand that once an identity is stolen, you can't exactly "get it back" or "get a new one", but they just don't seem to make the connection on the issue of card ID checks.
This practical component of the ID issue brings me around to the point of this post, and emphasizes why this is not strictly a political or intellectual issue. Day by day, people are becoming more habituated to giving out personal information for a wide variety of social interactions, and the usage of that personal information has suffered from a functionality creep in which information is being processed, aggregated, analyzed, and stored for an indefinite period of time. One prime example is the Social Security number; would the framers of Social Security have ever imagined that a nine digit number issued by the government for administering public benefits would eventually become more important to the private sector than the issuer itself? That number, along with other personal information readily available in public records, is all that is needed to steal an identity and commit fraud in someone else's name.
ID theft has become so pervasive because the usage and storage of personal information has become so pervasive. I can remember when the theft of a computer containing a few hundred personal records was news. Nowadays, a laptop containing a million records can go missing, and it might not see any more exposure than the local police blotter.
To the average consumer, civil liberties don't matter, as they aren't seen as a practical issue that one person can do anything about. One consumer can rant and rave all he or she desires, but it isn't going to make much of a difference. So, ultimately, people choose to pick their battles and give out personal information when asked.
This is why identity theft has become so rampant, and why society is bearing the costs of tens of billions of dollars in fraud. People might understand that an identity can't be un-stolen, but they don't understand exactly how many criminals will have their information once it hits the black market, and how the stolen profile can be referenced against public records after time passes, to keep it current and usable. People don't seem to understand that once the genie leaves the bottle, it can't be put back in. In this day and age, once your identity is stolen, you have to be on guard for life.
While the chances of any one instance of disclosing personal information where it isn't necessary leading to identity theft is low, the aggregation of all of those risks throughout years of daily life is a sizable risk, no different than the house's ~1.4% advantage in blackjack. 1.4%, in moderation, isn't much of a risk. However, as one continues to play, the odds of a ruined life, a bankruptcy, a failed marriage, and a downward spiral increase. If you play enough blackjack, you will lose.
So, in closing, the best protection against identity theft is to only provide personal information when it is absolutely necessary and fundamental to the transaction at hand, and no reasonable alternative exists to the disclosure of such information. Retail ID checks fit neither of the two criteria, and need to be proactively eliminated.